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An Economic Perspective 
on the Enforcement of 
Credit Arrangements:
The Case of Daylight 
Overdrafts in Fedwire
1. Introduction
redit arrangements between a borrower and a lender are a
 prevalent part of the economy. A fundamental concern for 
any lender is the risk that the borrower fails to fully repay the loan 
as expected, a type of risk called credit risk. Thus, lenders want 
credit arrangements that are designed to compensate them for—
and help them effectively manage—credit risk.
In certain situations, central banks engage in credit 
arrangements as lenders to banks. For example, the Federal 
Reserve offers certain banks overnight loans at the discount 
window. Additionally, it provides liquidity to many banks 
during the day whenever those banks must overdraw on their 
Federal Reserve accounts in order to make payments and settle 
securities. This extension of daylight overdrafts by the Fed can 
be interpreted as very-short-term credit, so the central bank is 
exposed to credit risk that it must manage.
This article discusses how the Federal Reserve manages its 
credit risk exposure from daylight overdrafts. We first present 
a simple economic framework for thinking about the causes of 
credit risk and the possible tools that lenders have to help them 
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• The Federal Reserve’s extension of daylight 
overdrafts to banks exposes the central bank 
to some credit risk during the day. 
￿ The Fed manages this exposure through a 
combination of tools, including monitoring,
an awareness of banks’ reputations, and 
collateral requirements. 
￿ Under a proposed policy change, the Fed 
would supply intraday balances to healthy 
banks through collateralized and 
uncollateralized overdrafts; banks would be 
allowed to pledge collateral voluntarily to 
support intraday overdrafts.
￿ An analysis of the increased use of collateral 
resulting from the change points to potential 
benefits—as well as costs—for the Federal 
Reserve, banks, and the financial system.
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manage it. We then apply this framework to the Federal 
Reserve’s Payments System Risk Policy, which uses a variety of 
tools to manage credit risk. Finally, we discuss a possible increase 
in the use of collateral as a credit risk management tool, as 
presented in a recent policy proposal published by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (hereafter, the Board) 
that considers changes to its Payments System Risk Policy 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008).
2. A Framework for Thinking about 
Contractual Relationships
Economists have developed a framework for thinking about 
contracts in general and credit arrangements in particular. We 
now summarize and illustrate the main elements of this 
framework. The emphasis is on first principles, an approach 
that provides a helpful basis for policy analysis.
2.1 Bad Luck versus Opportunistic Behavior
A borrower may not fully repay a lender for one of two reasons: 
bad luck or opportunistic behavior. By “luck,” we mean all 
random factors that affect borrowers’ and lenders’ actions and 
that are independent of their behavior. For example, weather is 
a random factor that can influence a farmer’s yield of corn 
independent of the amount of effort the farmer exerts. The 
effect of luck can typically be priced into a contract.
In contrast, opportunistic behavior—a privately beneficial 
action that increases costs to the other party in the transaction—
typically cannot be priced into a contract. Opportunistic behavior 
occurs when borrowers may not have sufficient incentive to do all 
they can to repay their debts. In the example of the farmer, the 
lender wants the farmer to put forth great effort to yield a large 
amount of corn and would like to be assured that the farmer will 
do so. The farmer is opportunistic if he does not work very hard in 
the field. By not working very hard, he may not yield enough corn 
to fully repay his debt to the lender.
Why do borrowers have an incentive to engage in 
opportunistic behavior? At the time a credit arrangement is 
made, all borrowers promise to repay their debt. Otherwise, 
lenders would refuse to lend. Once the loan is made, however, 
borrowers have an incentive to renege on their promise and 
default. The economic decision of the borrower is time 
inconsistent. In other words, the best decision at a given time 
(the promise made at the beginning of the credit arrangement 
to repay the loan) may no longer be optimal later because of the 
consequences of the original decision (once the loan is 
obtained because of the promise to repay, the borrower no 
longer wants to repay it). Anticipating this outcome, the lender 
may choose to forgo making the loan in the first place.
2.2 Enforcement
To achieve a good outcome, borrowers would like to be able to 
credibly commit to not reneging on their promise. A strong 
enough commitment can sufficiently address the time-
inconsistency problem.1 Experience shows, however, that this 
kind of commitment is difficult to make. Institutions, formal 
or informal, that help economic agents make credible 
commitments are said to provide enforcement. Courts are an 
example of such institutions, but many other examples exist.
If enforcement were costless to lenders, they could 
adequately control opportunistic behavior and it would not 
affect the decision to lend and the determination of the interest 
rate to charge. Lenders would typically charge an interest rate 
sufficient for them to cover the risk of bad luck in the credit 
relationship.
2.3 Information Problems
Enforcement is rarely, if ever, costless. In particular, a lender 
may have inadequate information about some actions or traits 
of the borrower. Economists distinguish between two types of 
information problems: moral hazard (or hidden actions) of the 
borrower and adverse selection (or hidden types) of borrowers.2 
Consider this example of moral hazard. It is well understood 
that if a bicycle is insured against theft, its owner is less likely to 
protect it as carefully as if it were not insured. The hidden 
action here is how carefully the owner protects the bicycle. 
Since the insurance company is unable to observe this action, it 
cannot make the insurance contract dependent on it.
An example of the adverse selection problem is found in the 
health insurance industry. The hidden type here is an 
1 A classical example of solving a time-inconsistency problem with credible 
commitment is found in the Greek myth of Ulysses and the sirens. Ulysses 
would like to hear the song of the sirens, but knows that once he does, he will 
be compelled to change the course of his ship and crash it against the rocks on 
which the sirens are standing. To enforce his commitment to not change 
course, Ulysses asks his sailors to bind him to the mast of the ship and to put 
wax in their ears. The wax will prevent the sailors from hearing the sirens and 
from hearing Ulysses when he asks his sailors to change course. Such elegant 
solutions to an enforcement problem are, unfortunately, not always available.
2 Moral hazard and adverse selection are terms from the insurance markets, 
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individual’s health. Someone who seeks health insurance 
knows his or her health better than the insurance company 
does. Individuals who believe they are likely to need a lot of 
medical attention, for instance, will want to choose insurance 
with better coverage.
In the context of a lending relationship, the lender may not 
be able to observe what the borrower does with the loaned 
funds. In the farming example, will the farmer buy equipment 
that will allow for a greater yield of corn, increasing the 
likelihood that the loan will be repaid? Or will the farmer 
instead buy a big-screen television, leading to lower effort and 
making it less likely that the loan will be repaid? Similarly, the 
lender may not be able to observe the borrower’s type. A lender 
will be more reluctant to lend to a farmer who has previously 
defaulted on other loans, which would suggest that this 
borrower is not a good type compared with a farmer who has 
never defaulted.
Borrower actions or types may be hidden from the lender, in 
which case they are called unobservable. Alternatively, they may 
be observable to the lender but hidden to parties outside the 
lending relationship, such as courts of law, in which case they 
are called unverifiable. In the previous example, the farmer’s 
use of fertilizer is observable and verifiable if the lender is able 
to ascertain whether fertilizer was used and if, in addition, a 
court is able to establish that fact. However, the quality of the 
fertilizer used may be observable but not verifiable if, for 
example, the lender can analyze the fertilizer but cannot prove 
to a court, or any other third party, that the farmer used a 
particular fertilizer of a certain quality. Finally, whether the 
farmer used the correct amount of fertilizer may be 
unobservable and unverifiable because neither the lender nor a 
third party can determine how much fertilizer was used.
Information that is either unobservable or unverifiable is 
typically called private—as opposed to public information, 
which is both observable and verifiable. Economists therefore 
classify contractual situations as either of two types: 1) those in 
which perfect enforcement is possible because all relevant 
information is publicly available and 2) those in which there is 
only imperfect or costly enforcement because at least some 
relevant information is private.
2.4 Enforcing Contracts through Reputation,
Monitoring, and Collateral
The information frictions described above can create credit risk 
over and above the risk that might come only from bad luck. 
Because of information frictions, a more sophisticated policy 
than simply charging an interest rate for a loan might be 
necessary. As we observed, when credit risk arises only from 
bad luck, no additional policy is necessary because nothing can 
be done to affect the probability that the loan will be repaid.
In principle, there are several ways to alleviate enforcement 
problems, and each method is costly. Because enforcement is 
not perfect, a trade-off always exists between better 
enforcement of contract terms and more costly means of 
ensuring enforcement. Among the ways of enforcing contracts 
in situations of imperfect information are reputation, 
monitoring, and collateral. We consider each of them in turn 
and provide an example of how a loan for a construction 
project uses all three.
Reputation
In cases of repeated interactions, the terms of a contract can 
depend on past actions. Borrowers can obtain better terms 
by establishing a reputation for good behavior. Reputation 
is achieved by showing a willingness to refrain from short-
term opportunism. Reputation can be thought of as a way to 
make private information about one’s type more public. In 
particular, it signals to a potential lender that a borrower is 
more interested in long-term outcomes (possibly because he 
or she wants to avoid punishments that restrict access to 
future loans) than any short-term gains achieved by 
defaulting on a loan. Reputation, therefore, can typically 
alleviate problems associated with adverse selection. In the 
case of a construction loan, a building contractor who wants 
to finance a new project may rely on reputation in 
negotiating terms for a new loan. A solid credit history 
increases the contractor’s chances of securing a new loan 
and allows him to negotiate favorable terms.
Enforcement is rarely, if ever, costless. In 
particular, a lender may have inadequate 
information about some actions or traits of 
the borrower. Economists distinguish 
between two types of information 
problems: moral hazard (or hidden 
actions) of the borrower and adverse 
selection (or hidden types) of borrowers.164 An Economic Perspective
Monitoring
Lenders can prevent opportunism by closely monitoring 
borrowers’ actions, by screening and certifying their quality 
and that of their project, or, after a default, by verifying the 
quality and amount of their assets and operations. Monitoring 
can be thought of as a way to acquire information that would 
otherwise be private. As a result, monitoring can typically help 
alleviate the incentive issues associated with both moral hazard 
and adverse selection. In monitoring construction loans, for 
example, lenders conduct periodic inspections and require 
status reports from the contractor or independent third parties 
as a way to keep track of the project’s progress.
Collateral
By posting collateral, the borrower offers a type of guarantee to 
the lender. Collateral may be something that has value to the 
lender so that the lender is at least partially compensated in case 
of default. In that particular case, the collateral plays an 
insurance role and need not have any value to the borrower. 
Collateral may also be something that has value to the borrower 
so that its loss punishes the borrower in case of default. In that 
case, the collateral plays an incentive role and need not have 
any value to the lender. In practice, collateral typically plays 
both roles in that it usually has some value to both the borrower 
and the lender. It is the incentive role that is most important 
from the perspective of reducing information frictions. Thus, 
collateral typically helps alleviate the incentive problems 
associated with moral hazard.
Various assets can be pledged as collateral. For example, 
loans for such durable goods as houses, cars, and boats are 
often secured by the goods themselves. In the financial sector, 
securities and other financial assets can be used as collateral for 
various types of loans. In our construction loan example, once 
a project is complete and a building is ready for sale, the 
contractor can convert the loan into a standard mortgage, 
which requires that the new building be pledged as collateral. 
This conversion can provide the borrower with more favorable 
terms, such as a lower interest rate.
Depending on the circumstances, some of these ways to 
alleviate enforcement problems may be more or less costly or 
efficient. Reputations may be costly or impossible to maintain 
if there are not enough opportunities to signal one’s type—for 
example, if relationships are short lived or if the economic 
environment evolves quickly and in unpredictable ways. 
Monitoring can be difficult or costly because it may require 
very specific and technical knowledge or because it may be 
possible to misrepresent the true state of a project. The use of 
collateral, too, is not without cost; there are costs involved in 
valuing and managing it. The collateral may have more value to 
the borrower than the lender, which implies that, in the case of 
default, the collateral is transferred from one agent that gives it 
a higher valuation to another agent that assigns it a lower 
valuation. This reallocation results in a loss to society. There 
may also be a cost associated with rationing credit if the 
collateral is insufficient.
Finally, technological advances can also change the relative 
costs and benefits of the various ways of alleviating enforcement 
problems. For example, innovations in information technology 
have improved recordkeeping and the transmission of infor-
mation. The effect of improvements in information technology 
has likely reduced the costs of reputation, monitoring, and 
collateral, making these tools more effective at reducing 
information problems. The ability to keep better records enables 
borrowers to signal information about their reputations. It also 
allows lenders to gather and evaluate information quickly, which 
reduces the cost of monitoring. Furthermore, better information 
technology can improve lenders’ evaluations of certain assets that 
can be pledged as collateral, reducing some uncertainty regarding 
the collateral’s value.
3. The Case of Daylight Overdrafts 
on Federal Reserve Accounts
We now turn to the specific case of the Federal Reserve’s policy 
regarding daylight overdrafts on accounts that banks have at 
the Fed.3 Most, but not all, of the value of overdrafts arises from 
banks’ Fedwire activity.4 Fedwire is a large-value payments 
system and a securities settlement system that banks use to send 
3 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2007).
4 Overdrafts can also arise from check clearing and settlement via the 
Automated Clearing House services provided by the Federal Reserve. The 
Federal Reserve’s overdraft policy applies to the net account balance resulting 
from activity over all Federal Reserve services to banks. Here, we focus on 
Fedwire because most of the value of overdrafts is the result of Fedwire activity.
The effect of improvements in information 
technology has likely reduced the costs of 
reputation, monitoring, and collateral, 
making these tools more effective at 
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each other funds and government securities on behalf of their 
customers and their own accounts. Transactions are sent over 
Fedwire one at a time with finality, which means that the 
Federal Reserve guarantees that the funds or securities a bank 
receives will not be revoked.5 Because transactions are 
processed one at a time, banks must have access to enough 
funds to complete each transaction. This need for available 
funds generates various frictions that banks face in the 
settlement of transactions, such as search frictions, timing 
frictions, and incentive frictions (see box).
The Federal Reserve alleviates the impact of these frictions 
by providing intraday liquidity,6 which allows qualifying banks 
to overdraw on their Fed accounts in order to make payments 
via Fedwire. Banks can acquire overdrafts throughout the day 
to make payments, but must ensure that their accounts are not 
in a negative position at the end of the day. The Federal 
Reserve’s provision of liquidity through daylight overdrafts can 
be interpreted as very-short-term credit.
This exposure is something the Federal Reserve must 
manage to protect itself from moral hazard or adverse selection 
problems that may arise from the type of information frictions 
described earlier. For example, because the Fed does not 
observe all the actions of banks, it may be concerned that some 
banks could use daylight overdrafts to finance excessively risky 
bets. Similarly, the Reserve Banks may not have full 
information regarding a bank’s risk of default on daylight 
overdrafts. The Fed currently manages its exposure to this form 
of credit risk with a combination of overdraft fees, reputation, 
monitoring, and collateral. We now turn to some specifics of 
the policy to make this connection clearer.
The Federal Reserve charges an explicit price for daylight 
overdrafts, currently a twenty-four-hour rate of 36 basis points 
less a deductible. This price, though small, is meant to provide 
an incentive for banks to minimize their use of daylight 
overdrafts. But even though this fee may help constrain the size 
of daylight overdrafts, and accordingly the Federal Reserve’s 
credit exposure, it does not address the information frictions of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. Thus, other aspects of the 
policy address those issues.
The daylight overdraft fee provides some incentive for 
banks to constrain the size of their daylight overdrafts. In 
addition, the Fed uses a net debit cap, which is the maximum 
dollar amount of daylight overdrafts that an institution may 
incur in its Federal Reserve account. Each bank that has an 
5 Although transactions cannot be revoked, that does not mean that they 
cannot be reversed. Reversals, however, are conducted by initiating a second 
irrevocable transaction. 
6 Note that some of these frictions are attributable to imperfect information 
and the absence of commitment. However, we focus here on the incentive 
problems arising from the provision of intraday liquidity by the Reserve Banks. 
account and that is also eligible for intraday overdrafts has a net 
debit cap. The policy on net debit caps is based on a set of 
specific guidelines and some degree of banking supervision. 
The policy allows for one of six ratings for a bank. For most 
Frictions in the Payments Systema
Search Friction
A search friction refers to the efforts that would be necessary for 
a payer (the party that intends to send a payment to some other 
party) and potential liquidity providers to make contact with one 
another and to determine the right amounts of liquidity to transfer 
to the payer’s accounts. If a payer did not have sufficient funds in 
its account and did not have access to overdrafts provided by the 
central bank, it would have to borrow the amount of the payment 
prior to sending it. But from whom should it borrow? The payer 
would not necessarily know which other party has sufficient funds 
in its account, and so it must search for such a lender.
Timing Friction
The timing friction refers to the operational difficulty of achieving 
the precise timing for when funds will be delivered during the day. 
Even if parties overcome the search friction and agree on a 
particular amount of funds to be delivered by one participant to 
another for the purpose of funding some time-critical payments of 
the borrower, how will the borrower be assured of receiving the 
funds at the given time? A commercial bank may have operational 
difficulties or experience delays for other reasons. The borrower 
would simply have to wait for delivery of the funds, which reduces 
the benefits of the arrangement.
Incentive Frictions
There are two incentive frictions to confront in adapting to a 
withdrawal of daylight credit. First, the rewards of providing 
intraday funding need to appropriately reflect the costs and risks of 
doing so. This is also true with overnight funding arrangements, 
but the intraday timing possibly exacerbates these frictions. 
Lending $1 billion overnight at a 4 percent interest rate yields 
approximately $111,000 in earnings, but lending it for an hour at 
the same rate would yield only $4,600. Assuming the processing 
costs for arranging the delivery and return of funds are fixed and 
roughly similar for an intraday and an overnight loan, then it may 
not be profitable for potential lenders to enter the market at low 
interest rates.
Second, payments system participants have the option to delay 
sending a payment rather than borrowing, if the cost of borrowing 
is too high. However, if all participants are inclined to delay, the 
system may be vulnerable to gridlock.
 a This material is borrowed from McAndrews (2006). 166 An Economic Perspective
banks, net debit caps range from zero to 2.25 times the bank’s 
risk-based capital.7
Net debit caps involve a great deal of monitoring. The 
Federal Reserve reviews supervisory information, evaluates 
banks’ self-assessments (if applicable), and then uses this 
information to assess the appropriateness of an institution’s 
cap category.8 This monitoring alleviates some problems 
associated with adverse selection.
The Federal Reserve also monitors a bank’s use of its 
daylight overdrafts against the cap, providing an opportunity 
for banks to establish reputations with their regional Federal 
Reserve Bank. In most instances, banks that exceed their cap 
limit are required to explain the reason to the Fed and then be 
counseled to prevent it from happening again. The Fed reserves 
the right to reduce net debit caps unilaterally, impose 
collateralization or clearing-balance requirements, reject or 
delay certain payments, or, in extreme circumstances, prohibit 
the bank from using Fedwire. Thus, maintaining a reputation 
of staying under the cap can help banks avoid such actions and 
can alleviate certain moral hazard concerns.
Although most daylight overdrafts are uncollateralized, 
the Federal Reserve uses collateral in two situations. First, it 
requires collateral from problem institutions to cover any 
incidental overdrafts. Second, banks wishing to increase their 
net debit caps can pledge collateral to do so subject to the 
Federal Reserve’s approval. The amount and type of collateral 
pledged are determined through an agreement between the 
bank and the Federal Reserve.9 Collateral plays an insurance 
role for the Fed in the event of a loss due to an overdraft. It also 
plays an incentive role for the bank to control its overdrafts and 
avoid risky behavior that could lead to its closure and forfeiture 
of the assets it pledged as collateral. Thus, the collateral here 
also overcomes certain moral hazard concerns.
7 For foreign banking organizations, a net debit cap is a function of no more 
than 35 percent of their worldwide capital (referred to as their U.S. capital 
equivalency).
8 Each bank that uses a relatively large amount of overdrafts must perform a 
self-assessment of its own creditworthiness, intraday funds management and 
control, customer credit policies and controls, and operating controls and 
contingency procedures. 
9 The type and value of collateral pledged are consistent with the Federal 
Reserve’s discount window policy.
The Federal Reserve’s policy regarding daylight overdrafts 
uses a combination of fees, monitoring, reputation, and 
collateral. Changes in payments and securities settlement 
systems, and their effect on the need for intraday liquidity, have 
led to periodic reviews of this policy to determine whether 
changes to it can improve the safety and efficiency of the 
payments system. Recently, in order to ease intraday liquidity 
constraints and reduce operational risk, the Board proposed 
changes to its Payments System Risk policy to supply intraday 
balances to healthy banks predominantly through explicitly 
collateralized daylight overdrafts.10 Under the proposal, the 
Board would allow banks to voluntarily pledge collateral to 
support intraday overdrafts. Collateralized intraday overdrafts 
would be charged a zero fee, while the fee for uncollateralized 
overdrafts would increase from 36 to 50 basis points.11 We now 
describe how increasing the use of collateral could bring 
benefits as well as costs to the Federal Reserve, to banks, and to 
the financial system as a whole.
3.1 The Benefits of Increasing Collateral Use
Greater use of collateral has the potential to benefit the Federal 
Reserve, banks, and the financial system in several ways.
The Federal Reserve could benefit because collateral 
provides it with some insurance in the event a bank cannot 
repay its overdraft. It may also benefit if greater use of collateral 
increases the incentives for banks to repay their overdrafts over 
and above the incentives already in place because of 
monitoring, reputation, and the existing use of collateral.
Banks could benefit if greater use of collateral relaxed some 
credit constraints. As we observed in the construction loan 
example, providing collateral can often allow a borrower to 
obtain better terms on a loan. For similar reasons, the Board’s 
policy proposal includes a zero fee on collateralized daylight 
overdrafts. In such a case, banks’ overdraft costs could decrease 
when they pledge collateral.
The financial system may benefit if the increased use of 
collateralized intraday overdrafts at the zero fee speeds up the 
flow of payments across financial markets. The lower cost of 
collateralized intraday overdrafts may lead to more payments 
being made earlier in the day, as banks would have less need to 
delay payments until they have sufficient incoming funds. By 
encouraging more banks to have collateral pledged at the Fed, 
increased use of collateral could make it easier for the Federal 
10 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2008).
11 There are other proposed changes as well. See Table 1 in Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System (2008) for a summary of all the proposed 
changes. 
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Reserve to inject liquidity both intraday and overnight in times 
of financial stress. This is true in particular because collateral is 
required for overnight loans. In addition, increased use of 
collateral may prepare banks for financial stress by increasing 
their ability to borrow at the discount window. All of these 
spillover benefits may accrue to the financial system through 
greater use of collateral.
3.2 The Potential Costs of Greater
Collateral Use
There are also possible costs to increasing the use of collateral.
The Federal Reserve could face higher costs associated with 
monitoring collateral, such as making sure it is available and 
valuing it properly. The Federal Reserve already pays such costs 
because it accepts collateral for overnight loans, but these costs 
could rise if the amount of collateral increases. Moreover, if 
there is a greater reliance on collateral for intraday overdrafts, 
banks may ask to manage their collateral more actively at the 
Federal Reserve, requiring the Fed to invest in enhancements to 
its collateral management systems.
Banks would have to pay costs associated with acquiring, 
managing, and tracking their collateral. Additionally, they may 
face an opportunity cost associated with using collateral to 
secure overdrafts because that collateral may no longer be used 
for other purposes. Banks may also reallocate their portfolio of 
assets to acquire enough collateral for daylight overdraft 
purposes. Whether this would constrain banks much depends 
on the type of collateral that the Federal Reserve and other 
banks are willing to accept.12
The financial system as well may be negatively affected by the 
greater use of collateral. Collateralized overdrafts make the 
Federal Reserve a higher claimant on assets of a failed bank, 
which reduces the attachable assets to residual claimants in the 
event of a bank liquidation, adversely affecting the unsecured 
creditors of that bank. This is an issue mainly if the policy is not 
explained well in advance so that some long-term contracts 
cannot be renegotiated. Another potential cost would occur if 
too much of the banking system’s assets are tied to 
collateralized daylight overdrafts. In extreme situations, this 
12 For discount window purposes, the Federal Reserve accepts a large range of 
assets of varying liquidity and credit risk, by which they are categorized. The 
collateral value of each asset is a discounted value of an asset’s determined 
price. This applied discount is based on an asset’s class. If the discounts 
accurately reflect a liquidity and risk premium, banks can have some flexibility 
in pledging collateral at the Federal Reserve and can minimize opportunity 
costs associated with collateral. The proposed policy would follow discount 
window practices to determine which assets are acceptable, those assets’ 
categories, and the discount applied to the assets’ determined price.
could lead to credit rationing in the economy should a shortage 
of collateral occur. Thus, the increased use of collateral could 
have negative spillover effects on the economy. Again, whether 
such a cost is likely to be large is an empirical question and 
depends on the range of collateral that would be acceptable to 
the Federal Reserve and other banks.
As with any policy proposal, a careful analysis of the overall 
benefits and costs of a change in the daylight overdraft policy is 
essential. It should be noted that the costs of a greater use of 
collateral are higher for banks if collateral were required for all 
overdrafts. But if banks are given the choice between 
uncollateralized lending and posting collateral (with a zero fee 
on collateralized daylight overdrafts), then their costs should 
be lower because collateral would be pledged by those banks for 
which it is the less costly option.
4. Conclusion
How to best enable the extension of liquidity by a central bank is 
an important policy question. As the examples presented here 
suggest, it may be desirable to use a combination of reputation, 
monitoring, and collateral. However, the relative role of each 
method of enforcing credit arrangements should depend on the 
details of the contractual relationship considered.
In the future, we can expect the risk faced by central banks to 
change over time, but we can also expect central banks to have 
access to more effective enforcement technologies. As banks find 
themselves in situations requiring them to take quick actions, 
credit risk can emerge unpredictably and without warning. 
However, the quality of the tools used by central banks to mitigate 
these risks has increased as well. For example, technological 
progress has the potential to make monitoring less costly and 
more effective in the future. Moreover, new technologies could 
reduce risk in a number of ways:
￿ The development of liquidity-saving methods for safely 
transferring balances could reduce the demand for 
daylight overdrafts.
￿ The development of improved markets during the day 
could potentially lead to a decreased demand for 
intraday overdrafts, as they are replaced by better 
methods of intraday distribution of liquidity. In other 
words, the frictions that require the provision of daylight 
overdrafts today may be reduced by enhanced 
technology.
￿ Technological progress will influence the need to rely 
heavily on reputation, monitoring, or collateral as some 
of these methods may become relatively more effective 
than others.References
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